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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, those concerned with the protection of individual rights have confronted an increasingly unsympathetic Supreme
Court. The Court's retreat from its Warren-era role as guarantor of
civil rights has led to bitter divisions within the Court itself and to
increasing questions over the purpose of the Court. This rift led Justice Stevens to state:
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[We must not forget that a central purpose of. . . a life-tenured federal judiciary, was to ensure that certain rights are firmly secured against possible
oppression by the Federal or State governments. ...
Yet the Court's recent
history indicates that.. . it has been primarily concerned with vindicating the
will of the majority and less interested in its role as a protector of the individual's constitutional rights.1

While the Court's internal debate is likely to continue, the civil
rights practitioner is unlikely to find her or himself in a much improved position. Reagan-era appointments to the federal courts are
typified by three factors-volume, conservatism, and youth.2 Faced
with an evolving federal hostility to civil rights jurisprudence, attorneys and the judiciary in many states have begun to turn to the parallel bills of rights found in state constitutions. 3 The strength of this
tactic is that, if pursued in pure form, federal jurisdiction is precluded
since no federal question is present.4
However, the technique is seldom pursued in its purest form. Civil
rights decisions almost never rest exclusively on state law. Federal
decisions may be used for purposes of comparison, or to support an
alternative holding. Worse, the typical decision is a haphazard mix of
federal and state precedent, resulting in a holding invoking both state
and federal constitutions. The likelihood that these decisions will be
reviewed by the United States Supreme Court depends on whether, in
the Court's balancing, the perceived need for uniformity outweighs
the deference due the state court system. Notions of comity and judicial restraint in a two-tiered state/federal court system lead to a presumption against federal review in ambiguously grounded decisions. 5
Under the Court's 1983 decision in Michigan v. Long,6 however, the
strong presumption against Supreme Court review of cases decided
under state law gave way to a presumption in favor of review. 7 This
1. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
2. Browning, ReaganMolds the FederalCourts in His Own Image, 71 A.B.A. J., Aug.
1985, at 60, 61-63.
3. For perhaps the most highly placed "call to action" in this respect (though far
from the only one), see Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977). See also Wilkes, The New Federalism
in CriminalProcedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court,62 KY. L.J. 421,
434-36 (1974).
4. But see supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). In Pitcairn,the Court stated:
[W]e cannot perform our duty to refrain from interfering in state law
questions and also to review federal ones without making a determination whether the one or the other controls the judgment.... [I]n cases
where the answer is not clear to us, it seems consistent with the respect
due the highest courts of the states of the Union that they be asked
rather than told what they have intended.
Id. at 127-28.
6. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
7. Id, at 1040-41.
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doctrinal reversal created some unusual results. In several decisions,
the Supreme Court has reversed and remanded state court decisions
only to have the result of the original decision reinstated on remand
by a state court relying on state constitutional provisions.8 This trend
has been accompanied by an expansion in the already rapidly growing
area of state constitutional jurisprudence. 9
This article addresses these issues in three parts. To develop the
framework for subsequent discussion, the first part examines the
treatment of state court cases with ambiguous state and federal
grounds of decision prior to Long. The Long decision is also examined.
The second part examines the impact of Long in the three years after
that decision. This inquiry examines trends within the Supreme
Court itself and the reaction of the state courts to these developments.
Finally, consistent with the increasing need for practitioners to rely on
state constitutional law, the third part discusses the more common
techniques used for arguing the independence and adequacy of state
constitutional provisions.' 0
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT
STATE GROUNDS
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution grants the Supreme Court appellate power to review cases arising under the laws and Constitution of
the United States,"1 subject to congressional regulations. 12 Since 1789,
8. See, eg., People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 150-59, 689 P.2d 430, 437-44, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 807-14 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2367 (1985); Commonwealth v.
Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370-73, 476 N.E.2d 548, 553-55 (1985); State v. Neville, 346
N.W.2d 425, 427-29 (S.D. 1984); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 817-22, 676
P.2d 419,422-24 (1984); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976). See gener-

ally Note, FinalDispositionof State Court DecisionsReversed and Remanded by
the Supreme Court, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1942).
9. It can also be argued that Long and its progeny have substantially weakened the
perceived authority of the Supreme Court. 'The reign of law is hardly promoted
if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling
decision of a state court." Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).

See also Note, Emerging JurisdictionalDoctrines of the Burger CourL" A Doctrine of Convenience, 59 ST. JOHN's L. REv.316 323-24 (1985).
Even prior to Long, state courts differed from the Supreme Court based on
state constitutional provisions on a number of occasions. However, as the Court
grew more conservative, the number of differences increased. One source indicates that since 1970, over 250 state appellate courts have rejected corresponding
federal decisions under state constitutions. See State v. Jewett, - Vt..
500
A.2d 233, 234 (1985).
10. This section was suggested in part by Jewett. In Jewett, the Vermont Supreme
Court ordered supplemental briefs on a state constitutional issue. After concluding that most practitioners overlooked state constitutional arguments, the court
provided advice on their use. Id. at -, 500 A.2d at 236.
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
12. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2.
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Congress has authorized appellate review of state court decisions in3
volving federal questions.'
The precise extent of this grant of power has never been clear. At
various times in its history, the Court has debated the contours of its
power to review state court judgments in terms of three questions.
The first, a threshold jurisdictional question, is whether the Supreme
Court may review a state court decision interpreting the law of that
state. If it may not, the second question is when should the Supreme
Court review the federal portions of an opinion resting upon both
state and federal law. Finally, if the second question is answered in
some manner other than "always" or "never," the third question is to
what extent does comity

4

require that the Supreme Court decline re-

view of a state court decision in which the state law issues may be
determinative.
A.

The Pre-Long Rules of Adequate and Independent State Grounds

Although the Supreme Court reviews only federal and not state
law,15 this limitation on the Court's adjudicatory authority may not be
constitutionally compelled. The potential for broader powers of judicial review stems from the Constitution's grant of jurisdiction to
"cases" rather than "questions." It could be argued, therefore, that an
Article III "case" includes all of the "questions" within it, including
questions of state law.16 For present purposes, this view is of only theoretical interest. In response to the first question, then, the Supreme
Court could theoretically reverse the judgment of a state court on that
13. Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 86-87. This section, now 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257, allows Supreme Court review of a final decision of the highest state court:
(1) By appeal, where the validity of a federal statute or treaty is drawn in question, and the decision is against its validity; (2) By appeal, where the validity of a
state statute is drawn in question on the ground that it violates the Constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity; or
(3) By certiorari, where the validity of a federal statute or treaty is drawn into
question; where the validity of a state statute is drawn into question on the
ground it violates the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States; or
where any title, right, privilege or immunity is claimed under the Constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
14. One early definition of comity is perhaps the best:
Comity concedes and allows, but does not withhold or prohibit. It
yields as a favor what cannot be claimed as a right. When it is the basis
of judicial determination, the court extending the comity out of favor
and good will extends to foreign laws an effect they would not otherwise
have.
Stowe v. Belfast Sav. Bank, 92 F. 90, 96 (C.C.D. Me. 1897).
15. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626-29 (1874).
16. See Note, The Buck Stops There: Michigan v. Long and the Development of State
ConstitutionalLaw, 17 CONN. L. REV. 197, 198 n.9 (1984). See also Murdock v.
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 641 (1874) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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court's construction of its own state law, but is not at all likely to. 17
The second question, when should the Supreme Court review the
federal portion of an opinion resting upon both state and federal law,
has its answer in the doctrine of adequate and independent state
grounds. The classic statement of this doctrine is found in Herb v.
Pitcairn:Ls
[The Supreme Court] will not review judgments of state Courts that rest on
adequate and independent state grounds... [The reason] is found in the partitioning of power between the state and federal judicial systems and in the
limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only power over state judgments is to
correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights [and]
not to revise opinions.1 9

Despite the jurisdictional language in Pitcairn,the actual question
is more likely one of comity. 20 But even given this judicial restraint,
difficulties arise when it is unclear whether a decision rests on state or
federal grounds. The original balance of comity struck between the
state and federal courts left the Supreme Court with four options.
First, the Court could place the burden on the party invoking the
Court's jurisdiction to show that adequate and independent state
grounds did not exist. Second, the Court could vacate the opinion and
remand for clarification. Third, the Court could continue the case and
force the litigants to seek clarification from the state court.2 1 Finally,
if it was clear that the state ground was insubstantial, the Court could
review the case without clarification from the state court. 22
The final option raises a question important to any analysis of
Long. To what degree must the Supreme Court be certain that a decision below did not rest on dispositive state grounds before it accepts
jurisdiction? Prior to Long, some opinions required a clear showing of
17. But see Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637 (1983). In Casal, Chief Justice Burger disagreed with a result compelled by state law, and wrote separately to remind the
Florida electorate that it was within their power to "ensure rational law enforcement." Id. at 639.
18. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
19. Id. at 125-26.
20. If the doctrine is not merely a matter of comity, and is instead jurisdictionally
mandated, the presumption of federal jurisdiction in Long is a per se usurpation
of the Supreme Court's constitutionally described role. The possibility suggests
the need for caution in both the adoption and use of the presumption.
21. This technique did, on occasion, prove ineffective. For example, in Dixon v.
Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952), a case was continued to allow the petitioner to secure
clarification from a state court. The state court only replied informally, indicating that "it doubted its jurisdiction to render such a determination." Id. at 145.
The Supreme Court was ultimately forced to vacate and remand. More than a
year lapsed between the request for clarification and the vacation of the state
court's opinion.
22. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTS 552-53 (3d ed. 1976). The last option, which is the
most similar to the presumption established in Long, was only rarely used. Note,

Supreme Court Treatment of State Court Cases Exhibiting Ambiguous Grounds
of Decision, 62 COL. L. REV. 822, 825-26 (1962).
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the federal grounds. For example, in Durley v. Mayo,23 the Court
stated that it must take "scrupulous care" to ensure that the opinion
below was based on federal grounds.24 At other times, the Court indicated that "jurisdiction cannot be founded upon a surmise," and that
the federal grounds must affirmatively appear from the record.2 5 In
Long, the Court gave a very different set of answers.
B.

The Rule in Michigan v. Long
1.

Statement of the Case

Long involved a typical search and seizure issue. When viewed on
federal grounds, the issue concerned the extent of the "stop and frisk"
rule first enunciated in Terry v. Ohio.26

Late one evening, two deputies of the Barry County, Michigan
Sheriff's Department observed a vehicle pass them traveling in the
opposite direction at 71 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone.27 Deciding to investigate, the deputies found the vehicle partially driven into a ditch. As
they approached the vehicle, David Long stepped out of the car. He
left the driver's door open and the dome light on. Mr. Long then
moved to the rear of the vehicle and met the deputies. He appeared
disoriented and unresponsive and, on the deputies' second request,
produced his drivers' license. When asked a second time for the car
registration, he walked toward the open car door. At this point, one of
the deputies observed a "large folding knife"2 8 lying on the floor of the
vehicle. He ordered Mr. Long to halt, and conducted a Terry search
for more weapons.
Finding no weapons on the defendant's person, the deputy pointed
his flashlight into the car "looking for another weapon."2 9 He observed a leather pouch under the armrest on the driver's side of the
vehicle. After lifting the armrest and shining his light on the pouch,
the deputy determined that it contained what appeared to be marijuana. The deputy then placed Mr. Long under arrest. After a more
extensive search of the vehicle's interior, which included the glove
box, the deputy impounded the vehicle. The deputy then asked Mr.
Long for the trunk key. However, after noticing that the trunk lock
had been removed, the deputy opened the trunk with a pocket knife.
A subsequent search of the trunk uncovered 70-75 pounds of mari23.
24.
25.
26.

351 U.S. 277 (1956).
1& at 281.
Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52, 54 (1934).
392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry established that an officer may conduct a limited warrantless search in circumstances where there is a possible threat to safety. Id at

27-31.
27. People v. Long, 94 Mich. App. 338, 341, 288 N.W.2d 629, 630 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
28. I& at 341, 288 N.W.2d at 630.
29. Id. at 342, 288 N.W.2d at 630.
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juana.3 0 Mr. Long was later convicted for possession of marijuana,
sentenced to 2 years probation, fined $750.00, and assessed $300.00 in
court costs.
On appeal, Long contended that both the contraband discovered in
the car and in the trunk were inadmissible evidence as the result of an
impermissible search. Resting its analysis solely on Terry and the
fourth amendment, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the initial search was valid as a protective search under Terry.31 The court
further held that the search of the trunk was a valid inventory search
under South Dakota v. Opperman,32 and affirmed as valid both the
search of the vehicle and trunk.
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed.33 The court initially noted
that the issue was whether the search had "violated the constitutional
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures," 34 and by
way of explanation cited both the United States and Michigan Constitutions in a footnote. 35 The court then undertook an analysis of Terry,
"[t]he test set forth by the United States Supreme Court to justify the
warrantless protective search." 36 The court held that "the deputies'
search of the vehicle was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution."37 Since the decision to impound the vehicle was based on an
38
invalid search, the evidence in the trunk was also suppressible.
Subsequently, the state petitioned for certiorari, alleging that
Terry had been misinterpreted by the Michigan Supreme Court.39
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the
Michigan Supreme Court's interpretation of Terry, and remanded the
portion of the case dealing with the search of the trunk for separate
consideration.40 In its original decision, the Michigan Supreme Court
had failed to reach this issue due to its conclusion that the original
grounds for the search of the vehicle were improper.
2. The Supreme Court's Decision
Prior to holding the compartment search to be permissible under
Terry, the Supreme Court addressed a threshold objection to its juris30. Id at 343, 288 N.W.2d at 631.
31. Id. at 344-47, 288 N.W.2d at 631-32.
32. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). Opperman held that no warrant is necessary to enter impounded vehicles for the purpose of securing the owner's valuables. Id at 369-71.
33. People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866 (1982).
34. Id at 471, 320 N.W.2d at 869.
35. Id at 471 n.4, 320 N.W.2d at 869 n.4.
36. Id at 471, 320 N.W.2d at 869.
37. Id at 472-73, 320 N.W.2d at 870.
38. Id. at 473, 320 N.W.2d at 870.
39. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
40. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1053 (1983).
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diction. Long contended that the decision below rested on adequate
and independent state grounds.41 Justice O'Connor began analysis of
this objection by noting:
Although we have announced a number of principles in order to help us determine whether various forms of references to state law constitute adequate and
independent state grounds, we openly admit that we have thus far not devel42
oped a satisfying and consistent approach for resolving this vexing issue.

The unsatisfactory nature of the previous methods, and their inconsistent application, were "antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is
required when sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved." 43 Thus, "[r]espect for the independence of state courts" required a new rule:
When the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not
clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed
that federal law required it to do so.4 4
41. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 4-5, Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
42. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1983) (footnote omitted). One puzzling
feature of the Long opinion is the need to explain an apparent shift in the views
of Justice O'Connor, the opinion's author. As recently as 1981, Justice O'Connor
(then on the Arizona Court of Appeals) complained that "state appellate court
judges occasionally become so frustrated with the extent of federal court intervention that they simply abdicate in favor of the federal jurisdiction." O'Connor,
Trends in the Relationship Between Federal and State Courts From the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801, 801 (1981).
Presumably, more state court justices know this frustration after Long. See
supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. See generally Welsh, Whose Federalism? The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties Judgments, 10 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 819 (1983).
43. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983). On the Court's perceived need for
uniformity, see Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U.S. 324 (1984). In Nunez, the interest in
uniformity prompted three Justices (White, Burger, and Rehnquist) to write explaining the federal position while dismissing a writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted, since the decision below rested on adequate and independent state
grounds. Id. at 324-27. See also Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297,
2312 n.2 (1985).
44. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). This portion of Long echoes language from Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977).
The opinion below, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d
224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), rested either upon a state interpretation of tort law or
on first amendment claims. The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction, and rejected the argument that the decision below rested on adequate and independent
state grounds:
Even if the judgment in favor of the respondent must nevertheless be
understood as ultimately resting on Ohio law, it appears that at the very
least the Ohio court felt compelled by what it understood to be federal
constitutional considerations to construe and apply its own law in the
manner it did.
!d. at 568.
A second doctrinal predecessor to Long is Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
652 (1979). In the decision below, the Delaware Supreme Court struck down ran-
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The Court also indicated that a state court wishing to avoid the
presumption of jurisdiction "need only make clear by a plain statement... that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of
guidance, and do not themselves compel the result ... reached."45
However, the decision must indicate "clearly and expressly that it is
alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
grounds." 46 This rule, in the majority's view, served both state and
federal interests:
It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or
obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by4 7 this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state
action.

Finally, applying the new rule to Long, the majority was unconvinced that the holding rested on independent state grounds. No state
cases were cited by the court below to support the proposition that the
search of the passenger compartment violated the Michigan Constitution, 48 and only two references to that constitution were made. 49 With
jurisdiction thus established, the Court held that the search of the passenger compartment was permissible under Terry.5 0 Since the Michigan Supreme Court had assumed that the illegality of the first search
rendered the trunk search invalid, that portion of the case was remanded for an independent determination of the legality of the trunk
search.51

45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.

dom stops and searches of automobiles, citing both state and federal constitutional law. State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359 (Del. 1978). However, a portion of the
opinion stated that "[tihe Delaware Constitution Article I, § 6 is substantially
similar to the Fourth Amendment and a violation of the latter is necessarily a
violation of the former." Id at 1362.
The Supreme Court rejected a jurisdictional argument based on adequate and
independent state grounds, and reversed on the theory that the state ground was
not independent. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 651-53 (1979).
It is arguable whether Long in fact shows respect for the state courts. In a
state having an elective judiciary, a state court justice on remand may be forced to
decide between making a politically unpopular decision, or maintaining low political visibility by "knuckling under" to an incorrect federal decision.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
1d&
Id. (quoting Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940)).
In the majority's opinion, the reference to People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224
N.W.2d 867, cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975), found in People v. Long, 413 Mich.
461,472, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869-70 (1982), merely served to show that the state's case
did not attempt to justify the search "by reference to other exceptions to the
warrant requirement." People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 472, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869-70
(1982). The majority did not believe this to be a reference to any independent
jurisprudence under Article I, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution. Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1043 n.9 (1983).
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1043 (1983).
Id at 1045-52.
Id at 1053.
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On remand, 52 the Michigan Supreme Court proved that Long had
been a well-chosen case through which to announce the new presumption of federal jurisdiction. Although one concurring opinion indicated that one justice had placed exclusive reliance on the Michigan
Constitution,5 3 the majority stated that the original holding was
4
"based on our interpretation of Terry... and other federal cases."
With respect to the issue of the trunk search, the Michigan
Supreme Court likewise decided the question on federal law grounds,
despite the fact that Long made a state constitutional argument on the
issue. "Since we conclude that the inventory search was improper
under federal constitutional law ... we need not address the defendant's state constitutional challenge."55 Satisfied with this conclusion,
or at least tired of trips to Washington, the state has not petitioned for
certiorari to date.
3. The Separate Opinions
Only five justices joined in the Long majority, and three separate
opinions were filed. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall
joined, dissented, arguing that Terry did not support the search of the
passenger compartment. Brennan's dissent, however, did not address
the presumption of jurisdiction issue.56 Justice Blackmun filed a one
paragraph opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
While satisfied that the Court had jurisdiction in this case, Justice
Blackmun explicitly refused to join in the new presumption of jurisdiction, which he felt would lead to "an increased danger of advisory
opinions."57
By far the most significant opinion is Justice Stevens' dissent. Justice Stevens' opinion raises the two issues which have been significant
in post-Long opinions-the exact relationship between the state and
federal courts, and whether the role of the Court is to vindicate individual rights, or to aid prosecutors who disagree with the holdings of
their own state courts.
Justice Stevens initially noted that "[t]he case raises profoundly
significant questions concerning the relationship between two sover58
eigns-the State of Michigan and the United States of America."
From here, the Justice poses the following hypothetical and answer:
If the Finnish police had arrested a Finnish citizen for possession of marijuana, and the Finnish courts had turned him loose, no American would have
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

People v. Long, 419 Mich. 636, 359 N.W.2d 194 (1984).

IM at 650, 359 N.W.2d at 201 (Kavanagh, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id at 639, 359 N.W.2d at 195.
Id at 646 n.5, 359 N.W.2d at 198 n.5.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1054-65 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
I& at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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standing to object. If instead they had arrested an American citizen and acquitted him, we might have been concerned about the arrest but we surely
could not have complained about the acquittal, even if the Finnish Court had
based its decision on its understanding of the United States Constitution ....
We would only be motivated to intervene if an American citizen were unfairly
59
arrested, tried, and convicted by the foreign tribunal.

He then criticizes the Court's conception of its role in recent years.
"I believe that in reviewing the decisions of the state courts, the primary role of this Court is to make sure that persons who seek to vin-

dicate federal rights have been fairly heard."60 Instead, the Court has
allocated its time to cases where those rights have been read too ex-

pansively. Here, "[t]he complaining party is an officer of the State itself, who asks us to rule that the state court interpreted federal rights
too broadly and 'overprotected' the citizen" of that state. 61 The result
of accepting these cases "is a docket swollen with requests by States to
reverse judgments that their courts have rendered in favor of their
citizens." 6 2 Thus, the Court has less time to spend in its proper function-the vindication of individual federal rights.63
Justice Stevens also noted that the need for uniformity was insufficient to support the majority's announcement of a presumption of jurisdiction. "We do not sit to expound our understanding of the
Constitution to interested listeners in the legal community; we sit to
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 1068.
Id. (emphasis in original)
Id.
Id. at 1070 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1068. One authority has described the difference between the O'Connor
and Stevens opinions as follows:
The positions expressed by Justices O'Connor and Stevens rest on
two different models of federal/state relations.... Justice O'Connor
subscribes to 'the interstitial model,' which holds that the dominance of
federal civil liberties law has resulted in state bills of rights being assigned the narrow function of 'filling in the gaps.' In contrast, Justice
Stevens' position follows the 'classical model,' which envisions a state
court as primarily enforcing state law, including state constitutional law.
Recourse to federal law is only necessary if state law fails to afford the
desired relief. Under this model, federal law assumes the limited 'gap
filling' role.
Welsh, Reconsidering the ConstitutionalRelationshipBetween State and Federal
Courts: A Critiqueof Afichigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1118,1120 (1984)
(footnotes omitted). See also Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of
State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1332-56 (1982).
The debate is not entirely theoretical and has a great deal to do with whether
a given opinion will adjudicate state claims first (possibly not reaching federal
claims) or federal claims first (possibly not reaching state claims). If the state
claim is not reached due to a decision on a federal issue, the state constitutional
jurisprudence is stunted. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. Compare
State v. Koppel, - N.H. -, 499 A.2d 977 (1985), with People v. Long, 419 Mich.
636, 646 n.5, 359 N.W.2d 194, 198 n.5 (1984) (remand of Long). See generally
Linde, Without "DueProcess'--UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv.
125 (1970).
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resolve disputes. If it is not apparent that our views would affect the
64
outcome of a particular case, we cannot presume to interfere."
Finally, returning to his hypothetical, he rejected the majority's
suggestion that the presumption shows respect for the state courts.
"Would we show respect for the Republic of Finland by convening a
special sitting for the sole purpose of declaring that its decision to release an American citizen was based on a misunderstanding of Ameri65
can law?"
III. ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS
AFTER LONG
A.

Supreme Court Cases

In post-Long Supreme Court decisions, the mechanics of the use of
the presumption of federal jurisdiction have become clearer, as have
the criticisms of the presumption itself. Post-Long decisions show that
the presumption of federal jurisdiction is quite strong, and that the
Court meant to be taken literally when it announced its rule that a
"plain statement" would be required from the court below to avoid
66
Supreme Court review.
An example of the use of the presumption is found in Californiav.
Carney.67 In Carney, officers entered a mobile home without a warrant and seized contraband. The state contended that the search was
permissible under the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement, developed in Carrollv. United States.68 Arguably, a slightly different version of this exception was articulated by the California
Supreme Court in Wimberly v. Superior Court.69 The California
Supreme Court cited Wimberly but did not otherwise discuss any differences between the state and federal standards.70
The California Supreme Court ruled that the search did not fall
under the automobile exception, citing both California's constitution
and the United States Constitution, which "provides a similar guarantee." 71 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court dismissed
in a footnote the defendant's contention that the decision below rested
on adequate and independent state grounds. Citing Long, the Court
64. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1071 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting ) (footnote
omitted).
65. Ik at 1072.
66. Id at 1041 (majority opinion).
67. 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
68. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Carrollheld that an automobile's inherent mobility justified
a limited exception to the warrant requirement. I& at 153.
69. 16 Cal. 3d 557, 563, 547 P.2d 417, 421, 128 Cal. Rptr. 641, 645 (1976).
70. People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 604, 668 P.2d 807, 810, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500, 503
(1983), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 2066 (1985).
71. Id. at 603, 668 P.2d at 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
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analyzed the issue in one sentence: "We read the opinion as resting on
federal law."72 A similar use of the proposition is found in Oliver v.
United States, in which the Court again disposed of the jurisdictional
73
attack in a brief footnote.
An even more illustrative example of the use of the presumption is
found in New York v. Quarles.74 In Quarles, a jurisdictional attack
was again disposed of in a footnote:
Respondent also contends that, under New York law, there is an 'independent
and adequate state ground' on which the Court of Appeals' judgment can rest.
This may be true, but it is also irrelevant. Both the [courts below]... did not
cite or expressly rely on any independent state ground in their
published deci75
sions. In these circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction.

The Court went to even greater lengths to apply the presumption
in Ohio v. Johnson.76 In Johnson, the text of the opinion below expressly relied on a state statute defining double jeopardy to invalidate
a conviction.77 The use of the state grounds was not clearly stated in
the syllabus, however. The Court ruled that the Long "presumption
must be applied in light of the syllabus rule of the Ohio Supreme
Court, which provides that the holding of the case appears in the syllabus, since that is the only portion of the opinion on which a majority of
the court must agree."7 8 The plain import of Johnson is that a state
court seeking to avoid the presumption of federal jurisdiction must
not only make a "plain statement" of state grounds, but must also be
careful to negate every inference that it did not make the requisite
"plain statement."
Another case seems to indicate that if a state court bases a holding
on two state grounds, it must make the plain statement for each of the
grounds to avoid Supreme Court review. In People v. Ramos, 7 9 the
California Supreme Court reversed a death penalty in a murder con-

viction. That court ruled that certain testimony had been prejudicial
under California law, and that a jury instruction had been improper

under federal law.8 0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and re72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068 n.1 (1985).
466 U.S. 170, 175 n.5 (1984).
104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
Id at 2637 n.2.
104 S. Ct. 2536 (1984).
The court below in State v. Johnson, 6 Ohio St. 3d 420,422-24,453 N.E.2d 595,598600 (1983), ruled that aggravated robbery and grand theft were "allied offense[s]
of similar import," and that further prosecution was barred under OHIO R. Cirv. P.
§ 2941.25(B).
78. Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2540 n.7 (1984). Compare Johnson with Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,441-43 (1952) (Supreme Court is permitted to consult an Ohio opinion for understanding of the syllabus despite the
syllabus rule).
79. 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982).
80. Id- at 591-602, 639 P.2d at 930-36, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 288-94 (1982).
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versed. The defendant argued that the evidentiary ruling represented
a possible adequate and independent state ground. The United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument since "the adequacy of this ruling to support reversal of the sentence was not addressed by the state
court." 81
In addition, the presumption has been given effect sub silentio. In
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,82 respondent briefed a lengthy argument stating
that the decision below rested on an adequate and independent state
ground.8 3 In its written opinion, the Court reversed on federal
grounds and did not discuss the jurisdictional argument.
Floridav. Casal8 4 provides a doctrinal insight into the Court's use
of the Long presumption. Casal is remarkable not for its facts or the
result reached, but for Chief Justice Burger's political pitch to the people of Florida to overrule their state court at the polls since he could
not do so judicially. Casal was initially granted certiorari despite the
possibility that the decision rested upon an independent and adequate
state ground.8 5 Later, the independence and adequacy of the state
ground was conceded by the Court, and the writ was dismissed as improvidently granted. Chief Justice Burger concurred, but wrote separately "to emphasize that this Court has decided that Florida law, and
not federal law or any decision of this Court, is responsible for the
untoward result in this case."8 6 The opinion concluded with an unprecedented plea to the Florida electorate:
[W]hen state courts interpret state law to require more than the Federal Constitution requires, the citizens of the state must be aware that they have the
power to amend state law to ensure rational law enforcement. The people of
Florida ... have
it within their power to do so with respect to Fla. Stat.
87
§ 327.56 (1981).

As the majority's willingness to use Long's presumption of federal
jurisdiction in more diverse and less clear situations has increased, so
too criticism of the presumption from other members of the Court has
expanded. In particular, Justice Stevens has expounded on his views
regarding the appropriate relationship of the state and federal courts.
Criticism of the majority's view of the Supreme Court's role and function has also continued.
In Californiav. Carney,88 Justice Stevens indicated that the pre81. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998 n.7 (1983).
82. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
83. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 8-15, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733
(1985).
84. 462 U.S. 637 (1983).
85. 459 U.S. 821 (1982).
86. Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 637 (1983).

87. Id at 639.
88. 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
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sumption is not only incorrect as a matter of comity, but causes the
Court to enter into unsettled areas of law prematurely:
Premature resolution of the novel question presented has stunted the natTo identify rules
ural growth and refinement of alternative principles ....
that will endure, we must rely on the state and lower federal courts to debate
and evaluate the different approaches to difficult and unresolved questions of
89
constitutional law.

Thus, while the states remain "different sovereigns," the federal
courts can, and should, draw upon the experience of the states by exercising restraint while the correct approach "percolates" 90 from possible alternatives. While waiting, the Court is free to continue in its
traditional role as vindicator of individual rights, rather than cor91
recting "cases presenting fact bound errors of minimal significance."
While the question of the fourth amendment status of mobile

homes discussed in Carney has been considered by at least some lower
courts, Justice Stevens found a more prematurely resolved question in
92
In Real, prison officials refused an inmate's request to
Ponte v. Real.
have another inmate testify on the prisoner's behalf at an administrative hearing for loss of "good time." The Court summarily reversed
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and held that the due
process clause did not require that the reasons for the refusal be
placed on the record. Justice Stevens again felt that the Court had
entered the area too soon:
No doubt the Court's sparse reasoning in this case and the utter lack of
empirical foundation for its bald assertions is in part a product of the fact that
not a single lower cour4 state orfederal, appears to have considered the alterrecords and in camera review that the Court today
native of 9sealed
3
forecloses.

Finally, in Massachusettsv. Upton,94 Justice Stevens developed his
89. IL at 2073-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens stated
these views prior to Long in McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983). In McCray, the Court denied certiorari in a case involving peremptory jury challenges
made on racial grounds. Justice Stevens explained his vote to deny certiorari by
stating that "it is a sound exercise of discretion for the Court to allow the various
States to serve as laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it
is addressed by this Court." IMi at 963.
The notion does have older roots. In the context of economic due process
cases such as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Justice Brandeis indicated
his belief that the Supreme Court should show deference to state legislation. "It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
90. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2075 n.8 (1985); id- at 2074 n.11 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
91. Id at 2072 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
92. 105 S. Ct. 2192 (1985).
93. r& at 2209 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
94. 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984).
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view that the ninth amendment provides further support for state
courts in developing state constitutional jurisprudence. In Upton, the
lower court invalidated a conviction on federal grounds, and as a result
refused to reach the state constitutional question. Justice Stevens
viewed this as the wrong order:
The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.'.
. The Ninth Amendment ... goes to the very core of the constitutional 9relationship
between ... sovereigns exercising authority over the
5
individual.

The court below erred because it "permitted the enumeration of certain rights in the Fourth Amendment to disparage the rights retained
by the people of Massachusetts under Art. 14 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights."96
Nor have Justice Stevens' criticisms of the rule in Long been limited to the Court's "cavalier disregard" 97 of the state courts. In F/orida v. Meyers,9 8 he evaluated a case that he believed to have been
based on adequate and independent state grounds:
[T]his case and cases like it pose disturbing questions concerning the Court's
conception of its role. Each such case, considered individually, may be regarded as a welcome step forward in the never ending war against crime ....
It may well be true that there have been times when the Court overused its
power of summary disposition to protect the citizen against government overreaching. Nevertheless, the Court must be ever mindful of its primary role as
the protector of the citizen and not the warden or the prosecutor. The Framers surely feared the latter more than the former.9 9

While the debate continues within the Supreme Court over Long,
the decision has not gone unnoticed in the state courts.1 00 The
changes which Long has caused in the state courts merits examination.
B.

The State Courts
The trend of state courts to ground civil rights decisions on state

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 2090 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
Id.
Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2543 n.* (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 S. Ct. 1852 (1984).
Id. at 1855-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The decision has also generated considerable commentary. See, e.g., Schleuter,
JudicialFederalismand Supreme Court Review of State CourtDecisions: A Sensible BalanceEmerges, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079 (1984); Seid, Schizoid Federalism, Supreme Court Power and Inadequate Adequate State Ground Theory:
Michigan v. Long, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1984); Note, Developing a State Jurisprudence Under Michigan v. Long, 12 Am. J. CRIM. LAw 99 (1984); Note, The
Buck Stops There: Michigan v. Long and the Development of State Constitutional
Law, 17 CONN. L. REV. 197 (1984); Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial
Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731 (1983); Comment, Michigan v. Long: The Supreme Court EstablishesPresumptive Jurisdiction Over State Court Cases, 20 NEw ENG. L. REV. 123 (1984).
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constitutional provisions did not begin with Long. One authority indicates that "[s]ince 1970, there have been over 250 cases in which state
appellate courts have viewed the scope of rights under state constitutions as broader than those secured by the federal constitution interpreted by the United States Supreme Court."10 1 The cause of this
trend is more accurately linked to increasing conservatism within the
Supreme Court.1 0 2 But Long, with its intrusive presumption of federal jurisdiction, only serves to increase the reliance of state courts on
state constitutional provisions.
One obvious implication of this trend is that in the state courts an
attorney who does not attempt to use state constitutional provisions in
his or her client's defense is not providing that client with a complete
defense. Justice Hans Linde, of the Oregon Supreme Court, has stated
that "[a] lawyer today representing someone who claims some constitutional protection and who does not argue that the state constitution
103
Jusprovides that protection is skating on the edge of malpractice."
tice Jones, of the same court, stated further: "Any defense lawyer
who fails to raise an Oregon Constitution violation and who relies
to
solely on parallel provisions under the federal constitution, except
04
exert federal limitations, should be guilty of legal malpractice."1
While the specter of legal malpractice may have been invoked prematurely, the Oregon Supreme Court is far from alone in its views. In
State v. Jewett, 0 5 the Vermont Supreme Court took the unusual step
of requiring the parties to file supplemental briefs on possible state
constitutional issues. The court reasoned:
To protect his or her client, it is the duty of the advocate to raise state constitutional issues, where appropriate, at the trial level and to diligently develop
and plausibly maintain them on appeal. It is the corresponding obligation of
the Vermont Supreme Court, when state constitutional questions of possible
merit have been raised, to address them or order that they be rebriefed....
If we breach this duty... 'we help to106destroy the federalism that must be so
carefully safeguarded by our people.'
101. State v. Jewett, - Vt. -, -, 500 A.2d 233, 234 (1985).
102. As the Burger Court has retreated in fourth amendment jurisprudence, the state
courts have been particularly active in finding independent guarantees in the
search and seizure area. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985);
Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528,
531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975); State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d
498 (1985); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974); State v. Koppel, N.H. -, 499 A.2d 977 (1985); State v. Benoit, - R.I. -, 417 A.2d 895 (1980); State
v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976); State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450 A.2d
336 (1982); State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (Wash. 1984).
103. Welsh & Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 14 CENTr MAG. Sept.Oct. 1981, at 6, 12.
104. State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 365, 667 P.2d 996, 1013 (1983) (Jones, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
105. - Vt. -, 500 A.2d 233 (1985).
106. Id at -, 500 A.2d at 238.
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Perhaps the best explanation of why this trend will be accelerated
by Long is found in a dissenting opinion following the remand of State
v. Jackson,1Ol a case decided by the Supreme Court shortly before
Long. In Jackson, the court held that the admission into evidence of a
defendant's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test violated state and
federal guarantees.lOS The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for
clarification and reconsideration in light of subsequent federal decisions.1 0 9 On remand, the Montana Supreme Court relied upon federal
cases to reinstate the defendant's conviction.110 Two dissenters saw
themselves as victims of the philosophy of the recently-decided Long
case. After agreeing with Justice Stevens' dissent in Long, dissenting
Justice Sheehy expressed what may well be the motivation for many
state court justices in the post-Long world:
Instead of knuckling under to this unjustified expansion of federal judicial
power into the perimeters of our state power, we should show our judicial
displeasure by insisting that in Montana, this sovereign state can interpret its
constitution to guarantee rights to its citizens greater than those guaranteed
by the federal constitution. 1 11

Dissenting Justice Shea seemed to agree. After discussing the
Supreme Court's "intrusionary" policy, and describing Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Casal as "arrogant," Justice Shea stated:
This philosophy appears to have permeated a majority of the members of
that Court and I suggest that this philosophy is what led to the remand in this
case. The Chief Justice would have state governments amend state constitutions and statutes to march lock-step with the judicial pronouncements of the
United States Supreme Court. 1 12

The state courts have also shown a willingness to avoid the presumption of federal jurisdiction by their use of a Long "plain statement."113 The "plain statements" of the state courts range from
simple to detailed, and from merely functional to almost sarcastic. In
1984, the Michigan Supreme Court (the initial victim of Long's presumption of jurisdiction) showed no desire to fall victim a second time,
stating that "for any future review, we offer the following 'plain statement.' As should be clear from our rejection of Belle Terre, our decision here is based solely on the Due Process Clause of the Michigan
"114
Constitution ....
Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Bartholo107. - Mont. -, 672 P.2d 255 (1983) (Jackson II).
108. State v. Jackson, 195 Mont. 185, 637 P.2d 1 (1981) (Jackson I).
109. Montana v. Jackson, 460 U.S. 1030 (1983) (Jackson I).
110. State v. Jackson, - Mont. - , 672 P.2d 255 (1983) (Jackson II).
111. Id. at -, 672 P.2d at 260 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
112. Id, at -, 672 P.2d at 264 (Shea, J., dissenting).
113. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
114. Charter Township of Delta v. Dinolfo, 419 Mich. 253, 276 n.7, 351 N.W.2d 831, 843
n.7 (1984).
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mew, 115 not only made a Long "plain statement," but specified that
any Supreme Court review would result in an advisory opinion. It
stated that "the independent state constitutional grounds we have articulated are adequate, in and of themselves, to compel the result we
have reached .... [A]ny decision by the Supreme Court limiting federal constitutional guarantees... will have no bearing on our decision in this case."116
It may be possible for a state court to make the Long "plain statement" once for all future opinions of that court. In State v. Kennedy,li7 the Oregon Supreme Court stated: "Lest there be any doubt
about it, when this court cites federal opinions in interpreting a provision of Oregon law, it does so because it finds the views expressed persuasive, not because it considers itself bound to do so by its
understanding of federal doctrines." 1 ' 8 While this statement may not
deter the Burger Court, it will certainly aid any practitioner arguing
the adequate and independent state grounds of any future opinion of
the Oregon Supreme Court.
Even dissenting justices have preceded an opinion with a Long
"plain statement." 119 The strength of this technique is that the dissent is preserved as persuasive authority for later decisions within the
state. Any argument that the dissenting opinion rested on, or was interwoven with, federal law is foreclosed.
While Long may have provoked some state courts into increased
reliance on state constitutional provisions, others have expressed
skepticism with the technique. For example, some commentators
have indicated that reliance on state constitutional provisions is used
as a "shell game"'120 to avoid federal precedent, rather than as an ex115. 101 Wash. 2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984).
116. Id. at -., 683 P.2d at 1087; See also State v. Von Bulow, - RI.....
475 A.2d 995,
1019, cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984) (independent state grounds as alternate
grounds for decision otherwise resting on federal law). That the state petitioned
for certiorari in Von Bulow is evidence that, as Justice Stevens has indicated,
"[t]he Court's inventiveness in the search and seizure area has also emboldened
state legal officers to file petitions for certiorari from state court suppression orders that are explicitly based on independent state grounds." California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2072 n.4 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983).
118. 1& at 267, 666 P.2d at 1321.
119. See, e.g., State v. Wyer, 320 S.E.2d 92, 106 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshberger, J., dissenting); State v. Rodgers, 119 Wisc. 2d 102, 125, 349 N.W.2d 453, 464 (1984) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
120. People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 277, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637
(Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976).
One commentator is in agreement: for some state courts, "the state bill of
rights is little more than a handy grab bag filled with a bevy of clauses that may
be exploited in order to circumvent disfavored United States Supreme Court decisions." Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a Reactionary
Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1, 2 (1981).
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pression of a result mandated by the state's own constitution. As one
justice has stated:
I am uneasy with decisions which reach a different result than the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of nearly identical language in the Federal Constitution .... Courts which fail to explain important divergences
from precedent run the risk of being accused of making policy decisions based
on subjective result-oriented reasons. 12 1

People v. Norman12 2 presents a similar pre-Long statement. In
Norman, the majority of the California Supreme Court rejected the
federal holding of United States v. Robinsonl23 based on state constitutional provisions. One justice dissented, noting that the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, § 19 of the
California Constitution contain nearly identical language. He concluded that "something more than personal disagreement by a majority of members of a state court with the decision of the United States
high tribunal on search and seizure is required if the persuasion of
that Court is not to be followed."124
While this criticism may be valid, it should be remembered that the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of similarly construed
federal provisions is only persuasive on state courts interpreting their
own state constitutions since the state courts have the ultimate authority and responsibility for the interpretation of their own state constitutions. A rejection of persuasive authority is thus validly based on
philosophical differences.
A related criticism is that:
The vagaries and uncertainties of constitutional interpretations, particularly in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment sectors of our criminal law, are
hard facts of life with which the general public, the courts, and law enforcement officials must grapple daily. This condition necessarily breeds uncertainty, confusion, and doubt. It will not be eased or allayed by a1proliferation
25
of multiple judicial interpretations of nearly identical language.
In State v. Lowry,12 6 a decision based on the Oregon Constitution, dissenting Justice Jones makes the same point. "This opinion will cause
121. People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 149 (Colo. 1983) (Erickson, C.J., dissenting).
See also People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976),
where a dissenting justice stated that "[t]he very obvious and substantial identity
of phrasingof the two Constitutions strongly suggests the wisdom... of identity
of interpretationof those clauses." Id. at 118, 545 P.2d at 283, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 371
(Richardson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
122. 14 Cal. 3d 929, 538 P.2d 237, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975).
123. 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (validity of warrantless search incident to unrelated arrest
does not depend on probable cause to suspect contraband).
124. People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 941, 538 P.2d 237, 246, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 118
(1975) (footnote omitted) (Clark, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Norman, 112
Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (opinion below, reversed on appeal)).
125. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 119, 545 P.2d 272, 284, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 372
(1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting).
126. 295 Or. 337, 667 P.2d 996 (1983).
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lawyers and judges to sit down for hours and unscramble what it [the
opinion] stands for and to determine what are the fine line differences
of the same or similar wordbetween state and federal interpretations 127
ing of parallel constitutional provisions."
In response to Justice Jones, it can be said that avoiding the introduction of uncertainty into the law is no reason to deprive defendants
of rights otherwise due under state constitutions. That federal law
fluctuates is no argument to fix it permanently; similarly, that the enforcement of state constitutional rights creates uncertainty is no argument for judicial abdication of those rights.
Perhaps the strongest criticism can be leveled against courts which
indiscriminately combine state and federal constitutional provisions in
the same holding. The criticism is that:
By invoking the state constitution the court insulates its decisions from federal judicial revievr, by simultaneously invoking the Federal Constitution, the
court effectively blocks popular review through the initiative process. In a
sense, this dual reliance makes the people... the prisoners of the privileges
1
conferred by their own state constitutions. 28

The "dual reliance" technique has been criticized as "increas[ing] the
state court's decision-making power vis-a-vis other branches of state
government, perhaps beyond the effective control of even a
supermajority of the state's citizens."1 2 9
IV.

ARGUING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSA CHECKLIST

Three years after Long, and eight years after Justice Brennan ad130
monished practitioners to invoke state constitutional arguments,
the techniques for invoking state constitutional provisions are becoming clearer. In State v. Jewett,1 3 1 the Vermont Supreme Court outlined some of these techniques. The court noted that "it is important
that the attorney consider the various approaches that can be taken to
The advocate in appellate argustate constitutional argument ....
ment may wish to copnbine several of these approaches, having in
mind that any collegial tribunal contains members with varying legal
backgrounds and philosophies."132 In the same spirit, the following
material outlines some of the more commonly used techniques.
127. Id. at 365, 667 P.2d at 1012 (Jones, J., concurring).

128. Deukmejan & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor--JudicialReview Under the
California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 975, 996-97 (1980).
129. Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground,45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750, 757-58
(1972).
130. See Brennan, supra note 3.
131. - Vt. -' 500 A.2d 233 (1985).
132. Id. at -' 500 A.2d at 236.
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Invoking the Independence of the State Constitution

Pre-Long state court decisions tended to "interweave" state and
federal precedents. This high degree of interrelationship led to a possible inference that decisions which otherwise might reflect an independent state constitutional jurisprudence, in fact merely reflect
outdated federal law.133 By invoking the independence of the state
constitution, this argument can at least be partially countered and the
framework set for further state constitutional analysis. For example,
in People v. Brisendine,3 4 the California Supreme Court stated: "This
court has always assumed the independent vitality of our state Constitution. In the search and seizure area our decisions have often comported with federal law, yet there has never been any question that
this similarity was a matter of choice and not compulsion." 3 5 In California v. Carney, 3 6 the defendant's attorney used this language to argue that although California precedent had been interwoven with
federal precedent, the California constitution could still be interpreted
as providing greater protection in the search and seizure area.31 7
The technique of invoking the independence of the state constitution was at least partially successful in Long itself. Long's attorney
argued that "[e]xamples of the greater protection afforded by the
Michigan Constitution abound."' 3 8 This statement was followed by a
series of paired opposites of rights granted by Michigan case law, yet
denied in federal cases. 139 In oral arguments, Justice Stevens repeatedly referred to People v. Secrest,140 a case which "says in words that
the State Constitution imposes a higher standard of protection than
,"141 Secrest, while not mentioned
does the Federal Constitution ....
2
in the lower court's opinion, was briefed by the respondent.4
133. For example, in Long, it was argued that "It]he Michigan Supreme Court has
interpreted Mich. Const. 1963, art. I, § 11, as being neither more nor less restrictive than US Const Am IV." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
134. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
135. Id. at 548, 531 P.2d at 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
136. 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
137. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 11, California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066
(1985).
138. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 5, Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983).
139. Id. See also Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 28, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983).
140. 413 Mich. 521, 321 N.W.2d 368 (1982).
141. Oral Arguments, Official Transcript at 16, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
142. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 4, Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983).

19861
B.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS

Analyzing the Wording of the State Constitutional Provision

In Jewett, the Vermont Supreme Court noted that "[a] state constitutional clause may... contain language that differs from parallel
provisions in the National Charter so that the former invites distinction on independent grounds." 14 3 The differences in wording may be
highly persuasive if properly raised. For example, in State v. Chrisman,144 the Washington Supreme Court, on remand from the United
States Supreme Court, found wider guarantees under the state constitution in a warrantless seizure case. The court stated that "[i]n the
area of search and seizure we rely upon independent state grounds
primarily because of the difference in language between [Wash.]
Const., art. 1, § 7 and the Fourth Amendment."145
Differences in constitutional language permitted one state court to
extend free speech protections beyond that required by the federal
Constitution. In State v. Coe,14 6 the Washington Supreme Court interpreted the Washington Constitution's provision that "[e]very person
may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that right."147 Because of the differences between the
wording of the Washington and the United States Constitutions, the
court accepted the defendant's contention that "unlike the first
amendment to the United States Constitution, the plain language of
art. 1, § 5, seems to rule out prior restraints under any circumstances
"148

C. Analyzing the Philosophical and Historical Background of the State
Constitutional Provisions
An historical and philosophical approach to state constitutional law
may "touch upon the legislative history of a particular provision, 'or
on the social or political setting in which it originated, or on the fate of
the [provision] in subsequent constitutions.' "149 For example, federal
decisions now base the exclusionary rule almost exclusively on a deterrence theory.150 If the state constitution mandates exclusion on another rationale (for example, reliability of evidence, or the autonomy
of the individual), it would be possible to reach a result under the state
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

State v. Jewett, - Vt. -, -, 500 A.2d 233, 236 (1985).
100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984).
Id at _ 676 P.2d at 422.
101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984).
WASH.CONsT. art. I, § 5.
State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d at 364, 679 P.2d 353, 359 (1984) (emphasis in original).
State v. Jewett, - Vt. _ -, 500 A.2d 233, 236 (1985); Linde, EPluribus- Constitutional Theory and State Courts, in DEVELOPNIENTS IN STATE CONSUTTIONAL

LAW 285 (B. McGraw ed. 1985).
150. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
446 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
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constitution different from that reached by 51the United States
Supreme Court under the federal Constitution.
D.

Using Local Statutes

Subject only to the requirement that new arguments may not be
raised on appeal, any statute adding local color also argues for an independent state ground. In State in the Interest of T.L.O.,152 counsel
for the defendant pointed to a local statute holding that juveniles have
153
the same right as adults to be free from unreasonable searches.
Although the tactic was unsuccessful on appeal in TL.O.,154 the statute could well have provided a basis for a finding of an adequate and
independent state ground.
E. Using Other State Constitutional Decisions as Persuasive Authority
"The advocate may also use a sibling state approach in state constitutional argument. This involves seeing what other states with identi15 5
For example in
cal or similar constitutional clauses have done."
State v. Coe,15 6 the Washington Supreme Court looked to two deci-

sions from states with similarly worded constitutional provisions. The
court used the reasoning contained in these decisions to establish a
broader free speech right under the state constitution, stating that
"[t]he reasoning of the California and Arizona Supreme Courts in interpreting identical or nearly identical provisions of their own constitutions is persuasive. It gives support for our own independent
151. See Oral Arguments, Official Transcript at 51, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733
(1985) (a Justice questions whether New Jersey law would mandate exclusion of
evidence independently of federal law). In T.L.O., briefs urging reversal frequently referred to the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., New
Jersey School Bd. Ass'n, Amicus CuriaeBrief at 21, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.
Ct. 733 (1985); Washington Legal Found.'s Amicus Curiae Brief at i, 2-3, New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985); Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 8, New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). If New Jersey law mandated exclusion on
grounds other than deterrence, the impact of these briefs could have been effectively countered.
152. State ex reL T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
153. Id. at 342 n.5, 463 A.2d at 939 n.5. See also Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 10,
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). The statute was N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4-60 (West Supp. 1982), which stated that "[t]he right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures ... shall be applicable in cases arising under
this act [N.J. Code of Juvenile Justice] as in cases of persons charged with crime."
Although repealed effective Dec. 31, 1983, see 1982 N.J. Laws 472, the statute was
in effect at the time of T.L.O.'s arrest.
154. One of the most interesting features of the T.L.O. decision is that the defendant/
respondent's argument that the decision below rested on adequate and independent state ground was not addressed by the Court in its opinion.
155. State v. Jewett, - Vt. -, -, 500 A.2d 233, 238 (1985).
156. 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984).

STATE CONSTITUTIONS

1986]

conclusion ...

"157

In addition to the use of other state court decisions, federal decisions may be used for comparison or persuasive authority. As Jewett
indicates, however, the practitioner should "[b]eware of using federal
cases and saying that they 'compel' a given conclusion."-58 This tech159
nique only invites review and reversal under Long.
Finally, in addition to the manner of invoking state constitutional
provisions, timing is crucial. A state constitutional argument must be
raised at the trial court stage. In State v. Thornton,16o the Maine
Supreme Court suppressed evidence based on an ambiguously
grounded decision that mentioned both the state and federal constitutions.1 61 The United States Supreme Court, applying Long, granted
certiorari, then reversed and remanded the case.' 6 2 On remand, the
defendant argued for suppression of the state's evidence based on state
constitutional grounds. The Maine Supreme Court refused to suppress, stating that "[t]his court has consistently held to the rule that
issues will not be considered on appeal unless they were raised at the
trial level.
...
163 While the possibility of a state constitutional decision was not foreclosed,164 the failure to timely invoke state constitutional provisions may have been the difference between acquittal and
conviction in Thornton.
V.

CONCLUSION

In and of itself, the presumption of federal jurisdiction in Long represents, at best, an unwise use of federal jurisdiction. Used neutrally,
the provision might lead to an occasional "advisory" opinion. What is
disturbing is the fact that the proposition has not been used neutrally.
Born as "a welcome step forward in the [Court's] never ending war
157. Id at -, 679 P.2d at 361.
158. State v. Jewett, - Vt. -,
_ 500 A.2d 233, 238 (1985) (quoting Carson, 'Last
Things Last" A MethodologicalApproach to Legal Argument in State Courts, 19
WLLAmETTE L. REV. 641, 651 (1983)).
159. If certiorari is granted in an ambiguous case, one other technique may become
relevant. Since Long mentioned the state constitution only twice, and quoted
only limited state precedent, it may be possible to favorably compare the amount
of state material in a given decision to Long. If favorable, this comparison would
establish a stronger case for an independent state ground. See, e.g., Respondent's
Brief on the Merits at 5 n.2, California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985); Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 11, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.
Ct. 733 (1985).
160. 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982).
161. Id. at 493-96.
162. Maine v. Thornton, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1739-40 (1984).
163. State v. Thornton, 485 A.2d 952, 953 (Me. 1984) (quoting State v. Desjardains, 401
A.2d 165, 169 (Me. 1979)).
164. State v. Thornton, 485 A.2d 952, 963 (Me. 1984).
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against crime," 165 the rule has helped the Court forget "its primary
role as the protector of the citizen and not the warden or prosecutor."166 The responsibility for the protection of individual rights is
now primarily a function of the state courts and those who practice in
them.
David G. Newkirk, '87

165. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 385 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
166. Id at 387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

